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At present, most scholars accept that late Renaissance and early modern philosophers like Montaigne and Charron, as well as the French moralists of the seventeenth century, including the "erudite libertines" 5 and the "divines" attached to Port-Royal(like Pascal and Nicole), and figures related to the Dutch Enlightenment, such as Spinoza and Pierre Bayle, exerted some kind of influence over Mandeville. 6 We can thus find among this group of influences in the background of his thought a considerable number of philosophers related to the early modern skeptical tradition.
Early on, two years after the publication in 1723 of the much enlarged and successful Mandeville's anti-rationalism and a similar element in the skeptical tradition and asserted that " […] the Sceptics were among the intellectual grandparents of Mandeville". 9 More recently, other commentators have related Mandeville either directly or indirectly (especially through his kinship with the foremost undeniably skeptical philosophers like Pierre Bayle, for instance) to skepticism. Notwithstanding this, there still seems to be no consensus about the exact nature of the relation of his thought to skepticism. In the present chapter I am trying to clarify this relation, focusing on some crucial elements of skepticism that permeate his philosophy in general, and his moral and political philosophy in particular.
Before entering into the core of my subject, I shall present a few preliminary remarks on the hypothesis that there was a scission between two kinds of skepticism precipitated by the Cartesian attack on traditional skepticism. In spite of its heterogeneity and its historical discontinuity since antiquity, some common traits can be used to identify a skeptical philosophical tradition. Among them are (1) that it is a philosophy that uses certain kinds of argumentation, (2) that it claims an attitude of searching for truth, (3) that it stresses antitheses and antilogies and (4) Nevertheless, Descartes's way of perceiving and trying to defeat skepticism from an anti-skeptical trend was effective in influencing the later skeptical tradition, obliging it to transform itself. An aspect of that transformation consisted in the aforementioned splitting of skepticism; another is that skeptical philosophers afterwards had to accept some Cartesian claims. is more striking and more complex than its previous presence in any other skeptical writing. The other family of skeptical thought to which Bernard Mandeville belongs is the medical one. 24 The specific medical outlook that he endorsed, which he himself described as akin to that of the sect of the "Empiricks", is striking in Mandeville's moral and political theory.
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The crisscrossings of skepticism and medicine have been so frequent throughout history since the inception of philosophical skepticism in Ancient Greece till now that they cannot but be considered important. Mandeville outstandingly illustrates in the early modern age this relation between skepticism and medicine, of which the most remarkable example in antiquity is none other than the philosopher 24 Discontinuity characterizes the history of skepticism both in antiquity and in the Renaissance and early modern age. But we can still refer to it (and to the ties between ancient skepticism and its renewal) as a tradition, albeit varied and many-sided. and enormous attention to perverse effects.
These traits, which show themselves as striking affinities between both authors, are far more important than signs of mere influence. They reveal that each of these two authors, developing an original and innovative philosophy, works out his ideas within a common framework that envelops them, that of the skeptical moral and political philosophical tradition.
Most early modern skeptical authors in the wake of Montaigne share the consideration that passions subdue reason and will and that they fundamentally govern human action and conduct. Mandeville, exploring similar views, develops a rather sophisticated theory of passions founded on the valorization of the self.
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Mandeville also emphasizes that his viewpoint is descriptive rather than normative. 
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An important issue in the interpretation of Mandeville's thought concerns his alleged foreshadowing of modern liberalism capitalism. According to a quite common view he defended some form of spontaneously ordered free market. The famous subtitle of the Fable of the Bees, "Private Vices, Public Virtues", forms an appropriate summary of his basic notion that if people pursue their own self-interest (which he calls "vices") a sort of harmonious equilibrium producing benefits for society as a whole will eventually turn up as an unexpected result (due to more or less complicated chance mechanisms). The most important point here seems to consist in the circumstance that the uncoordinated single efforts pursued by individuals pursuing their own interests and following their own "vicious" inclinations are paradoxically beneficial to the whole. And analogously, according to Mandeville, the coordination of those very efforts made willingly in order to achieve a common good is far less efficient than that later called "spontaneous order". This view seems to imply that a planned large-scale human intervention is doomed to fail due to chance and to the interplay of factors that cannot be controlled by human reason. But that does not mean that spontaneity magically begets order, either.
We see here at work a clearly paradoxical effect. It seems rather unlikely that
Mandeville would in truth dream of straightforwardly sustaining any economic and social system like modern capitalistic ones. In the first place, there is not a single known form of modern capitalism that really renounces some kind of rational order and deliberate interference with what the ancients called the whims of Fortune and the Christians called the mysterious designs of divine Providence. In the second place, there has never been any government that really endorsed the kind of realism claimed by Mandeville. Moreover, no historical known system officially sustains the objectives ascribed by Mandeville to his "grumbling hive". To the objection that forms of government that are really guided by such a set of values have prevailed throughout history though people in power hypocritically proclaimed other public objectives, while in reality pursuing those aims, one may reply that if that is true it does not only apply to liberal systems but also (albeit in perhaps a somewhat more recondite way) to other sorts of systems, including socialist ones. The point is that if we base our reading of society entirely upon the assumption of hypocrisy or dissimulation, we are at a loss because we will lack an adequate criterion to distinguish dissimulated statements from sincere ones.
That does not mean however that we have to put aside interpretations of Mandeville's economic and political thought such as the famous one sustained by
Hayek in 1951 (which was followed by many others in its wake) somehow claiming knaves. And the contrast alluded to in the subtitle has two faces, so to speak. The first one, which performs only a circumstantial function, is that the Author shows in the poem the bees engaging in knavish conduct and behaving honestly. The second one, the most impressive and important one, is that individuals acting as rogues may form a strong and wealthy collective, thus becoming elements of a sound society and consequently honest as long as they are taken as parts of a whole.
The poem itself explores the intertwining of this famous Mandevillian thesis, expressed as a paradox, with its also paradoxical counterpart: a hive stocked with corrupt and vicious bees was prosperous and powerful; once the hive, because of a divine intervention, became free of fraud and the bees acquired virtuous habits, it lost its prosperity and power. According to the first part of the paradox, when the insects followed their vices (or, as we normally translate Mandeville's use of that term, selfinterest) and behaved knavishly, business flourished and thrived, instead of decaying.
As Mandeville says: Note that he does not say that the mentioned vices will always entail beneficial consequences for the societies, but that we have to endure them and be contented with their role in society as far as they turn into benefits. That story is crucial to the Pyrrhonians. By an analogy with it Sextus explained the purpose or end of their philosophy, for they claimed suspension of judgment (epoche) was first attained in a similar way -only after having expressly renounced the attainment of their aim, they eventually attained it in fact through the suspension of judgment.
"So, too, the Sceptics were in hopes of gaining quietude by means of a decision regarding the disparity of the objects of sense and of thought, and being unable to effect this they suspended judgment; and they found that quietude, as if by chance, followed upon their suspense, even as a shadow follows its substance."
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This may stand as a metaphor for Mandeville's understanding of society and politics as well. 
